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Abstract  
Computer simulation is widely regarded as a useful activity during various phases of research. 
However, depending on its context, the meaning, definition, and focus of the term can vary: In traffic 
planning, for example, simulation is used to determine useful configurations of a road network, thus 
focusing on the environment. An entirely different perspective is used within multi-agent systems. In 
such settings, the environment of the agents remains static, while the interesting research questions 
concern the behavior of the agents themselves. The research focuses on the microscopic level and the 
resulting emergent behavior. This article puts such diverse meanings in the context of a research 
process that treats descriptive and prescriptive research as two sides of the same coin. We develop a 
framework to classify different types of simulation, based on the actual research activity they are 
intended to be used for. Two case studies supplement the framework.  
Keywords: Computer Simulation, Research Method. 
 
1 Introduction and Motivation 
Simulation has always been a part of different kinds of research processes in varying disciplines. 
However, there exists no common definition of this term in the different areas of information systems 
research (ISR), although simulations promise to be a valuable tool in ISR. In particular, if the research 
problem comprises (massively) distributed entities, the effects of parameter variation might be 
difficult or even impossible to predict due to the complexity of the system. In these cases, simulations 
provide a useful tool to understand the system’s behavior. Obviously, simulations are not without 
drawbacks, such as the subjectivity of model generation and result interpretation. An extensive 
discussion on advantages as well as limitations provide both Winsberg (2003) or Humphreys (2004). 
In this paper, we take on a positivistic perspective, as there are many cases in which simulations are an 
appropriate, if not the only feasible way of tackling research problems. 
On the one hand, simulation is used to describe a method for evaluation of scientific work; on the 
other hand, it is used as part of the theory building process. This broad range of meanings makes the 
term simulation prone to misunderstandings—especially in the communication between researchers 
using different methods. 
To shed a light on the different uses of simulation, this paper frames simulation in a research process 
for ISR. The process has been distilled from a literature review and tries to combine descriptive and 
prescriptive research into one consolidated model. It identifies four main activities in the research 
cycle and explains their relationships. Simulation can be used in almost any of these steps but with 
different purposes and implications. 
What is of particular importance here is the object of simulation which can be either the environment 
(in which real entities are being watched) or it can be the entity itself (e.g. a limited prototype of a 
software system) that is put in a real environment. The third possibility is the simulation of an abstract 
entity, such as a formal model, in a simulated environment. This is the setting that predominates most 
scientific simulation efforts within ISR, as the simulation takes place in a computer most of the time. 
This case is thus the main focus of this article. Furthermore, we explicitly exclude from our 
investigation simulations with real entities in real environments as it is used in biology, for instance. In 
ISR, such a setting would be the development of a prototype and thus a different research method. 
This leads to the main research question of this paper: How can simulation be applied to different 
phases within the research cycle (within ISR research)? For that purpose, we employ a categorization 
of simulation situations proposed by Hartmann (1996) and map the different simulation types to the 
various phases of a research process, which we designed by building on the works of March and Smith 
(1995). Since not all possible combinations are useful, with this we hope to provide a structured 
guideline on when to use what type of simulation, given a specific research question at hand. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: After the motivation, Section 2 introduces the 
consolidated research process. This paper’s research method is introduced after the research cycle, as 
it draws heavily on the process. Section 3 starts with an overview on different uses of the term 
simulation in research. Subsequently the different meanings of simulation are ported to the context of 
the research process and our actual guideline framework for the usage of simulation as a research tool 
is given in Section 4. To illustrate our guideline, a short case study is presented. We finish our paper 
with a short summary and description of future work. 
 
2 Research Process 
While ISR has been dominated historically by descriptive research, in recent years there is a growing 
trend to integrate Design Science (DS) into ISR to generate a more holistic view of research as such. 
This stream of research has been started by Herbert Simon in his influential book “The Sciences of the 
Artificial” (Simon 1996). He calls for a design oriented approach to research that does not aim to 
explain the environment, but rather to improve it. DS produces artifacts that serve a distinct purpose. 
Such artifacts should be evaluated on their utility instead of on their explanatory power. 
One reason to integrate DS into ISR is the claim for relevant (and not only rigorous) research. ISR has 
always aimed for rigorous research processes but might have neglected the relevance of the research 
issues (Frank 2006, p. 26). Relevance, on the other hand, has been the traditional strength of DS, as 
indicated continuously by large amounts of industry funds or by the stable demand of graduates of the 
German “Wirtschaftsinformatik” that focuses on the DS approach (Frank 2006, p. 5). 
The duality of research approaches seems to foster the “rigor vs. relevance” debate that continues to 
surface in ISR. However, different authors claim that research can be rigorous and relevant (Frank 
2006; Peffers et al. 2006; Pettigrew 1997). Indeed, ISR not only can, but should satisfy both 
requirements at the same time (Aken 2004, p. 223). Based on this assumption, the two research 
approaches should be integrated in such a way that both profit from one another. March and Smith 
developed a view on ISR that sees both approaches as structurally equivalent on an abstract level: 
Descriptive research (and natural sciences in general) consists of two activities. A theory has to be 
developed or discovered (theorize) and justified (March and Smith 1995, p. 255). They draw on earlier 
work by Kaplan that uses the same two activities but calls them discovery and justification (Kaplan 
1964, p. 14). 
DS is based on two activities as well. A researcher has to build an artifact that improves the 
environment. Subsequently, to prove that the research has been effective, the artifact needs to be 
evaluated (Hevner et al. 2004; March and Smith 1995). On this level of abstraction, the different aims 
of the approaches (truth or utility) are irrelevant: Both approaches try to either discover or to develop 
something new. Subsequently, this new entity has to prove its value in explanatory power or utility, 
respectively. 
Figure 1 shows a consolidated research process that combines the four activities with Hevner’s view 
that both research approaches complement each other (Hevner et al. 2004, p. 98). The top half of the 
research cycle displays descriptive research, the bottom half shows DS with the corresponding 
activities. 
 
Figure 1.  Consolidated Research Process 
The cycle has two potential starting points, depending on the research question to be addressed. If a 
researcher seeks to explain an observed phenomenon, the entry point is on the left hand side. He starts 
with an existing technology and discovers a behavior that has no explanation yet. In the discovery 
phase, he develops a hypothetical theory that could explain the phenomenon. To obtain a useful 
theory, it needs to be justified. All explanations and predictions of the theory must be consistent with 
the empirical findings. If the theory remains unrefuted by the available empirical findings, it can be 
used as a “tentative theory”. In line with Popper’s philosophy of science, it remains “tentative” 
(Popper 2002, p. 280), because it can still be refuted by empirical findings. The test of the theory 
occurs in the justification phase. 
The second potential entry point is on the right hand side. If the research question aims to solve a 
problem (Hevner et al. 2004, p. 78), the research is design oriented. Building on the theoretical 
foundations that have been generated by descriptive research, a researcher implements an artifact. 
After the implementation, the artifact must be evaluated. Only if it provides greater utility than other, 
existing artifacts, it is useful. 
One challenge with the evaluation in DS is the choice of metrics that provide a useful measurement of 
the utility of the artifact. In cases, where a hitherto unaddressed research problem is considered, the 
“research contribution lies in the novelty of the artifact and in the persuasiveness of the claims that it is 
effective” (March and Smith 1995, p. 260). A more general position is taken by van Aken (2004) who 
states that not the artifacts themselves but rather rules that can be deduced from the artifacts are useful 
results (Aken 2004, p. 227). It is not the very instance of a particular solution to a problem but 
generalized rules that can be applied elsewhere as well that advance the state of knowledge. 
To complete the cycle, an evaluated artifact can be the source of new descriptive research. The 
consolidated research process thus integrates descriptive with prescriptive research and allows for 
entry points using both methods. The choice of methods is based on the research problem to be 
addressed: If its aim is to explain something, it starts on the left hand side of the cycle and uses the two 
activities of descriptive research. Research that tries to improve the environment uses the DS part of 
the cycle. It starts on the right hand side and executes the two activities of prescriptive research. The 
research process thus provides a dynamic view on research.  
This paper itself can be viewed as an application of the research cycle. As we set out to develop a 
framework for simulation in ISR, the research is prescriptive. Therefore, we use the entry point on the 
right hand side and execute the two different research steps in the lower part of the cycle. The original 
problem that triggers the research effort is the only vaguely defined link between simulation and ISR. 
The build step, consists of a short literature review on the term “simulation” in research theory 
(Section 3). The research contribution lies mainly in the mapping of the various types of simulation to 
the research cycle (Section 4). The evaluation remains tentative as the framework itself is designed as 
a guideline only. It can be used to gain a clearer picture on the advantages and limitations of 
simulation in various phases of research in ISR. We present two small case studies the use simulation 
and show, how they fit into the framework. 
3 Simulation in Research Theory 
Before defining our actual methodical framework for simulation-based research, we give a broad 
overview on how simulation is perceived as a tool in the research world. To this end, we present which 
categorizations for simulation processes in research and industry are available at the moment. The 
integration of the dynamic and the static perspective is done on the level of these classes. In order to 
understand simulation as a research tool, it is necessary to derive a comprehensive definition of this 
concept. A quite prominent definition originates in the social sciences: Bratley et al. define a 
simulation to be a process of “driving a model of a system with suitable inputs and observing its 
corresponding outputs” (Bratley, Fox, and Schrage 1986). They very much follow the pragmatic view 
of Dooley who argues that simulations should answer a scientific question in the form of “What if?” 
instead of traditional research tools concentrating on “What happened and how and why?” (Dooley 
2002, p. 829). Humphreys, on the other hand, regards (computer) simulations simply as a computer-
based “solution method for mathematical models where analytic methods are … unavailable” 
(Humphreys 1990, p. 502). While this stresses the necessity for mathematical models, it also restricts 
simulation to those cases in which analytical methods do not work anymore. 
In the light of those considerations the most comprehensive definition of simulation was proposed by 
Hartmann (1996, p. 82): 
Simulation imitates one process by another process. In this definition, the term ‘process’ 
refers solely to some object or system whose state changes in time. If the simulation is run on 
a computer, it is called a computer simulation. 
We will use this definition for the remainder of this paper as it provides as a very generic definition 
capable of coping with the whole research process underlying our work. The definition fits with our 
view that simulation can be viewed as a tool within various research approaches. We follow the 
argument that simulation does not constitute a new science (Frigg and Reiss 2009), but should be 
integrated with the existing approaches. 
3.1 Types of Simulation Depending on the Underlying Model 
The basic definitions already show a very tight link between simulation as a tool for scientific 
investigations and theoretical or mathematical models. According to Bunge (1973), such models 
consist of a general theory as a conceptual foundation and a special description of an object or system 
(model object). The general theory provides fundamental rules describing the context of the scientific 
investigation (examples would be very comprehensive theories such as the theory of relativity). On the 
other hand, the model object defines an abstract description of a given object or process in the light of 
the underlying theory. Simulation, therefore, constitutes the process of testing or investigating a 
theoretical model by observing its development or performance over time, given a set of input 
parameters. It thus “imitate[s] the time-evolution of a real system” (Hartmann 1996, p. 82). Depending 
on the type of underlying model three categories of simulations can be identified: 
Simulations are either building on continuous or discrete models. For the former “the underlying 
space-time structure as well as the set of possible states of the system is assumed to be continuous” 
(Hartmann 1996, p. 83). Sometimes such models are also called system dynamics (Dooley 2002). On 
the other hand, discrete simulations build on “a discrete space-time structure right from the beginning” 
(Wolfram 1994). In particular, the set of possible states is denumerable (Hartmann 1996, p. 83). 
Carson (2005) provides a guideline to discrete event simulation, which includes the various types of 
simulation for different purposes. 
Some researchers, mainly originating in the social sciences, introduced a third category: agent-based 
simulations. In such simulations individual software agents (Jennings 2000) act and react within a 
virtual world in order to “maximize their fitness (utility) functions by interacting with other agents and 
resources” (Dooley 2002, p. 829). Agent-based models take decentralized view on a given system by 
trying to capture the individual utility functions and behavioral schemata for each entity (agent) in the 
virtual world and simulate the global system states emerging from those individual actors. 
In the following, another categorization for simulations is given, aiming at the goal of a simulation 
experiment. It should be noted that basically all combinations of discrete, continuous and agent-based 
with these categories are conceivable. The three types described in this section basically represent the 
“tools” of a simulation designer to be used for answering a certain type of research question. The 
possible types of such questions are listed in the next subsection. 
3.2 Types of Simulation Depending on Their Purpose 
Several researchers involved in different scientific communities working with simulation techniques 
(mostly social and natural sciences as well as research theory) identified ways for further categorizing 
these approaches. 
The dimension used for distinguishing simulation processes is the purpose of the actual simulation 
runs, i.e. the goals of the respective scientific investigations. The two main taxonomies were proposed 
by Hartmann (1996) and Axelrod (1997). Due to its more comprehensive nature, we build on 
Hartmann’s taxonomy for the remainder of this paper. In the following, we present his categorization 
in more detail, and indicate how it relates to Axelrod’s original work. 
Hartman identified simulation to be one of the following (Hartmann 1996): 
1. a technique – for investigating the detailed dynamics of a system 
2. a heuristic tool – for redefining or developing hypotheses, models or even theories 
3. a substitute for an experiment – for the execution of numerical experiments 
4. a tool for experimentalists – for supporting or calibrating actual laboratory experiments 
5. a pedagogical tool – for explaining a given process 
Simulation as a technique helps to understand a given system’s evolution over time (Hartmann 1996). 
Especially very complex systems often render it impossible to develop analytical solutions to research 
questions on a system’s behavior. In contrast to often applied approximation methods in analytical 
tools, simulation provides researchers with a possibility to investigate the complete mathematical 
model without wiping out extreme values or otherwise restraining the space of possible outcomes. 
This allows even for the testing of the underlying simulation model or theory (Hartmann 1996). The 
category roughly corresponds to Axelrod’s sixth purpose of simulation: proof (Axelrod 1997). 
Simulation as a heuristic tool can play an important role in “developing hypotheses, models or even 
theories” (Hartmann 1996, p. 86). Based on the data generated by simulation runs, researchers can 
identify new and simple regularities eventually leading to the formulation of new hypotheses and 
theories. Axelrod describes this flavor of simulation as discovery-oriented (Axelrod 1997). 
Simulation as a substitute for an experiment can be invaluably important in situations where 
researchers want to explore settings “that cannot (yet?) be investigated … by experimental means” 
(Hartmann 1996, p. 87), due to pragmatic (e.g. investigations on fluid behavior in the core of the sun), 
theoretic (e.g. what-if questions on different values for natural constants) or ethical reasons (Hartmann 
1996). To this end, simulations can be an accurate tool for the prediction of future system behavior, 
given the underlying assumptions hold. An example for this use of simulation is the weather forecast 
that relies on simulation. This use is analogous to Axelrod’s prediction class of simulations (Axelrod 
1997). 
It should be noted that simulation as a research tool is mainly investigated in the context of social or 
natural sciences following the descriptive research paradigm. They are used in these communities for 
investigating a given analytical model of a real world system. A completely different type of 
simulation is applied in engineering or computer sciences following a design oriented research 
approach. In such endeavors, the main concern is to create a simulated contextual environment in 
order to evaluate given characteristics of a developed artifact. A very prominent example for such a 
simulation process is the well-known wind tunnel in which new cars or airplanes are tested for their 
aerodynamic characteristics. This aspect will be central to the discussions within the next section. 
Simulation as a tool for experimentalists can be used, especially in the natural sciences, to inspire 
researchers for new experiments, to preselecting possible experiment setups (especially important in 
cases of very high experiment costs), or to analyze experiments (identifying statistical noise to be 
subtracted from the results) (Hartmann 1996). 
Simulation as a pedagogical tool finally stresses the potential for “instructing students … by playing 
with a simulation model and visualizing [its] results on a screen.” (Hartmann 1996, p. 87). Axelrod 
elaborates a little more on this aspect as he further distinguishes pedagogical simulations for training, 
entertainment and education uses (Axelrod 1997). 
This categorization approach marks a valuable input for our theoretical framework presented in the 
next section. However, it focuses on a static perspective on computer simulations whereas we intend 
to provide a process-based view on simulation in research. Thus, our framework augments current 
work with an additional dynamic perspective. 
4 A Guideline Framework for the Usage of Simulation as a 
Research Tool 
As shown in the previous sections, numerous researchers have discussed both research theory and 
simulation as a research tool or method. Surprisingly, very little discussions can be found on how 
these two areas link, i.e. in what phases of the research cycle simulation can be used and for what 
purpose. This section aims at closing that methodological gap by relating the different categories of 
computer simulations to the four fundamental phases in research: theorize, justify, design and 
evaluate. To this end, each of the different simulation types is investigated and subsequently linked to 
the respective research phases, to which it can contribute. 
When looking at simulation literature, it becomes quite obvious that most of the discussions do not 
comprise the prescriptive branch of the research cycle. Being the oldest and thus traditional research 
approach, most discussions tend to circle around descriptive sciences of one form or another. 
Nevertheless, following the rationale from Section 2, we think such approaches take on a perspective 
too narrow as they basically omit just about half of the overall research cycle. Although it is 
understandable that the descriptive sciences receive the most attention, we deem it absolutely crucial 
for prescriptive researchers to critically reflect the research tools at their disposal. Simulation is but 
one example for such a tool. 
A first assertion that can be made on simulations as a research tool is that Hartmann’s fifth flavor, 
simulation as a pedagogical tool, is not really relevant for an investigation on research methods. 
While such simulations are extremely valuable for the training of students and researchers new to the 
field of investigation, they play no significant role, once actual research questions are addressed. In the 
following, we first try to explicitly relate the remaining four simulation categories with the two 
descriptive research phases. In a second step, we attempt to port these views to the prescriptive side. 
We try to show perspectives on using simulation as part of prescriptive research and give researchers 
following that paradigm access to the powerful tool computer simulation. Table 1 gives an overview 
on which types of simulation can sensibly be used in which of the four research phases. 
4.1 Simulation in Descriptive Research 
The first of Hartmann’s categories is simulation as a technique. The purpose of such simulations is to 
give a researcher a more profound knowledge of the internal dynamics of a system, ultimately 
providing him with a tool for the confirmation or disconfirmation of a theory under investigation. This 
type of simulations can be related to a distinct research phase very easily, as its purpose is basically 
congruent with the definition of the justify phase. In this step, a researcher tries to confirm or even 
prove a given theory. On the other hand, simulations supporting the proof of a given theory or 
hypothesis are not actually suitable for discovering new hypotheses. Consequently, descriptive 
researchers can use simulation as a technique in the justify phase only. 
 
 Descriptive Research 
 Theorize  Justify 
Technique —  — Gaining understanding 
and finally confirmation 
of theories and models 
Heuristic Discovery of new 
models, hypotheses and 
theories 
— — 
Substitute — — Confirmation or 
disconfirmation of 
theories 






— — — 
 Prescriptive Research 
 Build  Evaluate 
Technique Gaining understanding 
of used artifacts and 
grounding the design on 




— — — 
Substitute — — Evaluation of the 
artifact 






— — — 
Table 1.  Simulation for Different Purposes and Phases in the Research Process 
However, Hartmann also refers to a type of simulation aiming at exactly the task undertaken in the 
theorize phase: simulation as a heuristic tool. In such simulations, new patterns or regularities are 
sought in the data produced by the simulation of a given theory and respective model. Based on these 
patterns, researchers are trying to generate new hypotheses or theories on the simulated systems. This 
matches the task undertaken in the theorize phase whose sole purpose is to define new hypotheses or 
theories to be confirmed or falsified in subsequent steps. Following the rationale above, simulations as 
heuristic tools are not suitable for the justify phase. 
Simulations as a substitute for experiments are closely related to Hartmann’s first category described 
above. Ultimately, they aim at confirming or disconfirming a theory using simulations, in this case as 
a substitute for a laboratory experiment. The main difference is probably that the mere goal of gaining 
understanding of the dynamics of the model is not as prominent as with simulations as a technique. 
For the same reasons as simulation as a technique, simulations as a substitute for experiments are not 
really suitable for discovering theories as desired in the first phase of the research cycle. 
The last class, simulations as a tool for experimentalists, is hard to relate to just one phase of the 
research cycle. On the one hand, such simulations directly relate to the developed theories (theorize 
phase) when inspiring new experiments focusing on the theory-relevant aspects of a system, on the 
other hand they help to set up further experiments, which in turn aim at proving or at least confirming 
a theory (justify phase). To this end, we place this type of simulation in between both descriptive 
research phases. Simulations as a tool are basically applied when researchers take a theory developed 
in the first phase and try to design experiments to be conducted in the second. Figure 2 applies the 
different purposes to the research cycle and shows the usage during the four phases. 
 
Figure 2.  Purpose of Simulation Applied to the Research Process 
4.2 Simulation in Prescriptive Research 
In his categorization of simulation, Hartmann does not include the DS oriented research in his 
approach. Consequently, he does not map any of the five different flavors to DS activities. However, a 
mapping seems possible if one takes Hartmann’s descriptions of the various purposes into account. 
Hartmann did not mention (DS) artifacts while defining the description of simulation as a technique. 
Nevertheless, we view simulation as a valid tool within the build phase of DS. Fundamental theories 
and models need to be integral parts of any artifact (and thus of the proposed solution to the research 
problem) to make a valid research contribution. In particular, if an artifact makes use of different 
theories, a researcher needs to gain an understanding of their relation before the mix of theories can be 
applied to actually implement an artifact. Another, closely related application of simulation as a 
technique is the understanding of the interplay of different components that add up to the final artifact. 
The interaction of the subsystems (Hartmann 1996, p. 7) must be understood if a useful artifact is to be 
constructed. In a simulation, theories can be tested in different settings and improve the understanding 
of the interaction. Since a “simulation is no better than the assumptions build into it” (Simon 1996, 
p. 14), the grounding of the theories and models is indeed crucial to generate a valid research 
contribution. As such, Hartmann’s first purpose represents a valid use of simulation to provide input 
for the build phase. 
Simulations as a heuristic tool is a purpose, which is not applicable to DS research. Hartmann states 
the aim of simulation as a heuristic tool as the development of new “hypotheses, models or even new 
theories” (Hartmann 1996, p. 85). Simulations are a tool to find new regularities in potentially 
interesting settings that a new model (or theory) could explain. In DS, however, research starts with a 
narrowly defined question that shall be solved. Therefore, the second purpose of simulation is used in 
descriptive research only. 
One of the major uses of simulation in DS is the substitute for an experiment. DS cannot stop after the 
implementation of a new artifact, but must evaluate it regarding its utility afterwards. Without rigorous 
evaluation, the artifact may be useful but does not contribute to the advancement of science (Aken 
2004, p. 229). One way of evaluating an artifact is the construction of a prototype that is placed in the 
real environment. If it works as expected and solves the problem (either for the first time or better than 
any existing solution) it is a useful artifact. The definition of the term “better” and “useful” in the 
evaluation of new artifacts is domain specific and must be proposed by the researcher or is provided 
exogenously. In both cases, the artifact is measured on metrics that are context bound: The artifact 
does not aim for general truth, but for utility in a given situation (Aken 2004, p. 227). 
The development of a prototype, however, can be restricted or even be impossible for the same three 
reasons that form the basis of the use of simulation as a substitute for experiments in descriptive 
research: It may be theoretically, ethically or pragmatically impossible to conduct a real experiment. If 
either one of these reasons holds, simulation can be a valid means to evaluate an artifact in DS. 
The impossibility of an experiment highlights one of the main advantages of simulation compared to 
results from a traditional research approach, such as testbeds. With simulations, the designer has full 
control on the simulated entity as well as the environment. Thus, he is free to try the entity even in 
situations, that are improbable or even impossible to encounter in reality. The simulation can still be 
useful to gain an understanding of the system’s behavior in extreme situations. 
Simulation can be a means for the inspiration of new experiments, analogous to descriptive research 
efforts, or of the range of system setups (Hartmann 1996). Another reason for the use of simulations as 
a tool prior to the evaluation is the identification of “trivial or well-understood” (Hartmann 1996, 
p. 87) effects that prescind the attention from the interesting results. Simulating the actual experiment 
can determine and quantify such effects. Their measurements are subtracted from the results of the 
experiment to account for uninteresting “noise” that stems from those effects. 
4.3 Case Studies 
To provide an example on how the framework can be used to distinguish between different types of 
simulation, we use the paper by Crooks, Hudson-Smith, and Dearden (2009), who use two kinds of 
simulation. They propose to use “Second Life”, one of the most well-known multi-user virtual 
environments, as an environment for simulation models. 
First, they use simulation as a technique to gain knowledge by implementing three different models 
and observing the results to gain a more thorough understanding of the models involved. In the later 
part of the paper, the authors introduce humanly controlled avatars (as opposed to fully automated 
ones) to the pedestrian evacuation model. Thereby the simulation changes its goal: By introducing 
humanly controlled avatars the simulation does not only aim to understand the phenomenon, but 
includes the (presumably unpredictable) behavior of humans as well, potentially stipulating new 
phenomena, not accounted for in the original model. While still being on the descriptive side of 
research, the simulation is used as a heuristic tool now.  
On the prescriptive side of research, simulations are most often used during the evaluation. One 
example is the simulation of the patient scheduling in hospitals (Niemann and Eymann 2008). They 
use simulations to evaluate the performance of a newly designed scheduling mechanism. As the 
scheduling affects the patients in the hospital, it is impossible to test the effects of the mechanism in 
situ without a clear understanding, how varying parameters determine the outcome. Simulations fill 
the gap by allowing thorough testing of the mechanism without comprising the patients’ safety. 
5 Conclusion and Outlook 
This article has presented a consolidated research process that includes both descriptive and 
prescriptive approaches in ISR, pointing out that the researchers in ISR are not bound to one of the 
two, but can still choose their method depending on the research problem at hand. 
While ISR can make use of descriptive as well as prescriptive research (and indeed it should include 
both approaches), a particular research problem should still be addressed with the suitable approach to 
yield reasonable results. This decision can be made based on the purpose of the actual research 
problem: If it aims to explain a phenomenon, the research is descriptive and should employ the 
corresponding activities. If the research aims for improvement of the environment and is evaluated 
based on utility (with a suitable definition of utility), it is prescriptive and should incorporate the two 
activities build and evaluate. 
The research cycle thus provides a process based view on ISR activity acting as a fundamental basis 
for our guideline framework which tries to link different classes of computer simulations to the right 
activities within the cycle. Hartmann’s classification of simulations, obviously having descriptive 
research in mind, is extended analogously to prescriptive research phases. In doing so, we identified 
that different classes of simulation correspond to distinct activities within the research cycle. Only if 
the right types of simulation are used during the right activities, they can be a useful tool in the overall 
research process. If unsuitable classes of simulation are used (for instance: simulations as heuristic 
tool during the evaluation phase), these simulations are unnecessary and do not contribute to the 
research result. Hence, our framework can aid researchers in employing simulations in ISR as it 
provides a guideline on when to use what kind of simulation throughout the whole research cycle. 
However, our work does not provide researchers with the actual steps to be undertaken in a given 
research project or even how to parameterize their experiments or simulation settings; it is intended to 
be an abstract guideline, allowing researchers to identify applicable simulation technologies and thus 
enable them to do a more precise investigation on such techniques in a second step. 
In the future we will investigate whether our guidelines can be empirically validated based on the quite 
significant simulation works done in ISR. In a second step, we hope that our framework can help to 
identify reasons why some simulation works are quite well received in the community (potentially 
because they intuitively adhered to our framework) and why some are not. This could ultimately give 
researchers the perspective on their work needed to create the impact it deserves. 
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